The projections of energy related carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions in the Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) serve as point of departure for an assessment of plausible ranges of CO 2 emissions that could be avoided through CO 2 capture and storage measures. Scenario and time dependent, sector and fuel specific capture factors are developed for eleven world regions to estimate the proportion of CO 2 resulting from fossil fuel and biomass combustion/ conversion that might be practical to capture and store. The capture factors are applied to the original CO 2 emissions scenarios at a highly disaggregated level. The results are summed up and presented. The results indicate that it might be possible to capture and store a significant quantity of energy related CO 2 , especially in the second quarter of this century. Yet the amounts of CO 2 still being emitted remain considerable, suggesting that other technologies will also be needed if the threat of climate change requires large reductions of CO 2 emissions over the next few decades.
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His current focus is on sustainable energy development of different energy supply and demand options and capacity building in energy-environment planning.
Objective and scope
In the second half of the past century, the use of fossil fuels, especially coal and oil, passed two major technology transitions, first in the developed countries, followed by the economies in transition as well as in more affluent developing countries. The first transition was triggered by local/regional air pollution problems (urban smog with severe visibility degradation and human health impacts) and entailed the removal or broader dispersion of heavy hydrocarbons (C x H y ) from stack gases. The second change was prompted by continental scale pollution problems that involved long range transport of air pollutants (mainly SO x and NO x ) causing material corrosion, forest degradation and the acidification of water bodies. The response to both transitions encompassed a set of technologies ranging from precombustion fuel treatment to flue gas scrubbing to reduce the emissions of pertinent compounds as well as fuel and technology switching. The increasing concern over anthropogenic climate change and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the first legally binding global agreement to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, poses the next challenge to the fossil fuel industry. If large reductions of GHG emissions are necessary over the next few decades, the viability of fossil fuels will depend on the possibility and prospects of preventing the release of CO 2 into the atmosphere.
An increasing number of studies address the technological and economic aspects of CO 2 capture from fossil fuel combustion and the geological and environmental issues of its storage (Edmonds and Wise, 1998; Nakicenovic and Grubler, 2000; Kuemmel, 2000; Lackner, 2003) . The importance of the topic is also confirmed by the fact that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) commissioned a Special Report to assess the economic, technological, geological, and other relevant aspects of CO 2 capture and storage. The Greenhouse Gas RandD Programme of the International Energy Agency (IEA GHG, 2003) has produced a collection of reports for use in the preparation of the IPCC report. The IEA GHG material includes contributions on power generation and CO 2 capture, the transmission, storage and utilisation of CO 2 , the environmental aspects of CO 2 capture and storage and other related issues. The 19th Energy Modelling Forum (EMF 19) provides the first comprehensive report on modelling studies of the technologies and technology change specifications adopted in policy analyses of global climate change (Weyant, 2004) . As part of EMF 19, Edmonds et al. (2004) explore the potential role of several energy technologies, including CO 2 capture and sequestration, in stabilising atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. Other studies consider the environmental implications. Smekens and van der Zwaan (2004) analyse the possible environmental externalities of geological CO 2 storage and the implications of their inclusion in long term energy scenarios. This paper presents the first global scale assessment of the amount of CO 2 that might be technologically and economically feasible to capture and store over the medium (2020) and longer (2050) time horizons across a broad range of plausible scenarios. We take the most widely used projections of greenhouse gas emissions prepared by the IPCC (2000) as our starting point in Section 2. Four sets of capture factors are presented in Section 3 that reflect expert judgements about the fractions of projected CO 2 emissions that might be possible to capture from the use of key fossil fuel types in main economic sectors across major world regions in different scenarios of socioeconomic development. These capture factors are applied in Section 4 to estimate the amount of CO 2 that might be possible to retain and store. The closing section presents the released (uncaptured) emissions in the form of a simple uncertainty analysis and summarises our main conclusions.
Carbon dioxide production
The reference point for our analysis is the year 2000. The International Energy Agency (IEA) compiles detailed accounts of CO 2 emissions and the time series reaches back to 1971. Historically, these CO 2 emissions are equal to the total amount of CO 2 produced, since no attempt has been made to capture and store CO 2 except for a few sites of technological research and experiments. The sectoral distribution of CO 2 emissions is rather uneven. The distribution of CO 2 emissions from different sectors in 2000 is presented in Table 1 based on IEA (2003a). We aggregate the national data into world regions that roughly correspond to the typical regionalisation of the global energy economy models, the results of which will be used in subsequent sections. Yet we keep the original IEA sectoral detail in this table.
In the past, a few sectors have produced the bulk of the CO 2 emissions. Power generation, industry and transport produce over 70% of the energy related CO 2 emissions globally. The first two sectors involve large point sources in most world regions, whereas transport related emissions stem from myriads of mobile sources. The second cluster of emissions sources (residential, energy transformation, services) includes very diverse and typically small scale point sources, except for centralised district heating systems in some countries/regions. Bunkers, emissions from feedstocks, losses/leakages and other small sources are lumped together in the 'all other category' that produced about 5% of the total energy related CO 2 emissions in 2000.
Future, anthropogenic CO 2 productions are the outcome of different driving forces such as demographic development, socioeconomic development, technological change and fossil resource endowment. Because their future evolution is inherently uncertain and there are numerous reasonably possible combinations of different rates of change, analysts resort to scenarios as a means to describe internally consistent alternative images of how the future might unfold. In 1996, the IPCC plenary decided to develop a new set of greenhouse gas emission scenarios upto the year 2100. A writing team of 50 experts from around the world developed four narrative storylines as the basis for their new scenarios, and based on the four storylines, produced four sets of scenarios called 'families': A1, A2, B1 and B2 which altogether included 40 alternative scenario quantifications extending to 2100 (IPCC, 2000) . This set of scenarios was developed to represent a range of driving forces and emissions that reflect current understanding and knowledge of underlying uncertainties. By design, none of the 40 scenarios includes policies designed to avoid or mitigate climate change. The set of scenarios consists of six scenario groups drawn from the four families: one group each in A2, B1, B2 and three groups within the A1 family, characterising alternative developments of energy technologies: A1FI (fossil fuel intensive), A1B (balanced -defined as not relying too heavily on one particular energy source, on the assumption that similar improvement rates apply to all energy supply and end use technologies) and A1T (predominantly nonfossil fuel). For each of the six scenario groups, an illustrative scenario is provided (see Figure TS .1 in reference IPCC 2000). Table 1 Regional and sectoral distribution of energy-related CO 2 emission in 2000 (Mt CO 2 )
The four storylines can be summarised as follows: Economic objectives dominate in the 'A' storylines while environmental objectives dominate in the 'B' storylines. The '1' storylines incorporate strong globalisation trends and greater international integration. In contrast, the '2' storylines are better characterised by regionalism than globalisation.
• The A1 storyline and scenario family describe a future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income.
• The A2 storyline and scenario family describe a very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is self reliance and preservation of local identities. Fertility patterns across regions converge very slowly, which results in high population growth. Economic development is primarily regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change are both more fragmented and slower than in other storylines.
• The B1 storyline and scenario family describe a convergent world with the same low population growth as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material intensity and the introduction of clean and resource efficient technologies. The emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental challenges, including improved equity, but without additional climate initiatives.
• The B2 storyline and scenario family describe a world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social and environmental challenges. It is a world with moderate population growth, intermediate levels of economic development and less rapid and more diverse technological change than in the B1 and A1 storylines. While the storyline is also oriented toward environmental protection and social equity, it focuses on the local and regional levels.
These scenarios became known as SRES scenarios labelled after their publication 'Special Report on Emission Scenarios'. They lead to a wide range of possible future worlds and CO 2 emissions consistent with the full uncertainty range of the underlying literature (Morita and Lee, 1998) . Some SRES scenarios foresee a continuous increase in CO 2 emissions of up to 128 GtCO 2 /yr by 2100 (A1FI and A2) or 73 GtCO 2 /yr (B2). Others show an increase during the first half of the 21st century up to 95 GtCO 2 /yr (A1B) or 66 GtCO 2 /yr (B1) at the peak period, declining to around 73 and 37 GtCO 2 /yr, respectively, by 2100 while another (B2) achieves quasi emission stabilisation at only 45 GtCO 2 /yr by the end of the century (see Figure 1 ). Considering that energy related CO 2 emissions currently are around 24 GtCO 2 /yr, the conclusion is that most scenarios yield future emissions significantly higher than today. The SRES scenarios are important as they provide a backdrop for determining the baseline for emission reductions that may be achieved with new (soft or hard) technologies especially implemented for such purposes. For the purposes of presenting future CO 2 productions and the potential for its capture in this paper, we take six principal scenarios from SRES: three markers, two illustrative scenarios and one marker substitute. Each scenario presentation is based on results from the model designated to provide the marker/illustrative cases within the given scenario family/group for SRES. They are: the Asia Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) for scenario A1B, the Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental Impact (MESSAGE) for A1T and B2, the Mini Climate Assessment Model (MiniCAM) for A1FI and the Integrated Model to Assess the Greenhouse Effect (IMAGE) for B1. Data from the Atmospheric Stabilisation Framework model (ASF) that was used for the quantification of the A2 marker scenario in SRES are not available in a sufficiently detailed sectoral and regional resolution. Instead, the IMAGE model was selected as a substitute and its results are used in our analysis. Moreover, for reasons of comparison, the different levels of regional segregation of the different models (and hence scenarios) are aggregated to roughly comparable units: 9 to 11 regions, depending on the model. Appendix IV of IPCC (2000) presents an overview of the modelling approaches underlying SRES and the scenarios adopted in this section. For the present study, modellers provided detailed output files of their SRES runs to enable us to perform the estimation of capture potentials at the necessary levels of disaggregation. Results were then aggregated according to economic sectors, fuels and geographical regions to the level of highest degree of comparability. The total CO 2 emissions stemming from these model runs provide the upper limit for the potential CO 2 capture and storage from fossil energy sources. The overall theoretical maximum is higher because one needs to consider the possibility of CO 2 capture from biomass. Although the share of biomass related CO 2 emissions is rather modest according to all models in all scenarios, these emissions are also included in the tables of emissions and capture potentials below.
The SRES results indicate that despite several strong shifts, the sectoral and geographical distribution of CO 2 production remains rather uneven in all six scenarios. CO 2 production values projected by the six principal (marker, illustrative and substitute) scenarios are presented in Figure 2 . The more detailed sectoral and regional data are summarised in the Appendix (Table A1 ) for these and a second set of scenarios produced by different models, while an even more detailed data set indicating fuel sources behind the future CO 2 emissions by region and sector for the years 2020 and 2050 is available from the authors upon request. Geographically, the distribution of emission sources is set to change substantially. Between 2000 and 2050 the bulk of emission sources will shift from the OECD countries to the developing regions, especially China, South Asia and Latin America. As for emissions by sector, power generation, transport and industry remain the three main sources of CO 2 emission over the next 50 years. However, the power sector that accounted for 40% of global CO 2 emissions in 2000 and typically represents large point sources is, in several scenarios, falling behind the transport sector (mobile sources) by 2050 (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
As regards the share of emissions across sectors in 2020, there is an inherent divergence between scenarios with longer and shorter time horizons. Given the quasi perfect foresight of their underlying models, the SRES scenarios account for resource depletion over a period of a century and due to the anticipated transition to higher fuel cost categories in the longer run, shift to nonfossil energy sources much earlier than, for example, the IEA (2004) scenarios, especially for electricity supply. Consequently, the shares of fossil sourced power generation range from 43 to 58% by 2020 in the SRES scenarios while the IEA projects a share of 69%. The corresponding sectoral shares in CO 2 emissions mirror the electricity generating mix: IEA projects 43% for power generation compared with 28-32% in the SRES scenarios.
Capture factors
From a purely technical perspective, emissions from all stationary sources can be captured, putting the theoretical capture potential at 100%. For practical reasons, the technically suitable capture potential is much lower than the theoretical potential while the economic potential is lower than the technical potential. For example, capturing CO 2 emissions from stoves in household kitchens or tailpipes of vehicles is technically impractical (though feasible) and economically infeasible. Likewise, existing small boilers and furnaces in industries may need too much additional duct work, etc., for which there is no space available without major reconstruction and substantial associated costs. Needless to say, it is the economic potential that matters. Estimating the economic or market potential for CO 2 capture and storage as a measure for GHG emission mitigation is the subject of many current studies (Allinson et al., 2003; McFarland et al., 2003; Ha-Duong and Keith, 2003) . These studies assess the economic or market potential of different CO 2 mitigation options, e.g., the increased use of renewables, nuclear power, clean fossil technologies including CO 2 capture and storage, efficiency improvements, etc., for different CO 2 reduction or atmospheric concentration targets based on detailed technology performance characteristics and data. Still, such analyses require a zero order comprehension of the technical/practical potentials of each mitigation option. The following paragraphs contain estimates of the technical/practical potentials of future CO 2 emissions that might be suitable for capture. The six illustrative SRES scenarios summarised in the previous section serve as a point of departure.
• The underlying storylines guided the estimation process. Lower capture factors are largely consistent with scenarios emphasising decentralised energy supplies while higher factors are associated with centralised supply structures.
• For each fuel type of fossil fuel and biomass in each sector and each region, fractions of emissions suitable for future capture were estimated.
The estimates accounted for technical/technological feasibility to add the required equipment and integrate the necessary processes to capture CO 2 before, during, or after combustion/conversion. For the year 2020, a detailed assessment of the power plants currently in operation around the world and those planned to be built in the near future was conducted, together with a review of industrial boilers in selected regions. Based on the size in terms of installed capacity, fuel and other technical parameters such as transportation distances, capture factors were established showing the maximum share of emissions estimated to be technically plausible to capture. Note that the potential for CO 2 storage in geological formations or deep oceans has not been assessed in this study. Finally, market penetration rates were estimated for capture technologies or technologies suitable for precombustion/conversion decarbonisation that reflect the time required to install the necessary infrastructure by implying modest shares for 2020 compared with 2050.
After an initial set of capture factors was compiled, a panel was convened to review, discuss and refine them. The panel included specialists from power plants and industrial energy technologies, energy systems analysts and energy economists. Based on the results of the expert panel, the four sets of scenario dependent capture factors were finalised, that differ across regions, sectors and fuel types. The capture factors are presented in Table 2 .
It is important to note that, despite substantial efforts expended on making results from different models comparable, this could not be fully accomplished.
• methodological differences lead to different representations of energy technologies and their future evolutions • the sectoral disaggregation and the energy/fuel details vary across the models.
• there are differences in how countries of the world are grouped together into regions.
Tables in this section attempt to show the best possible approximation to make the regional results comparable.
In the assessment of capture factors, perhaps the most important open question is what will happen in the transport sector over the next few decades. If the enormous increases in the transport sector projected by all models in all scenarios will involve traditional engine technologies then capture and storage of transport related CO 2 will remain theoretically possible but technically meaningless (excess weight, onboard equipment, compression penalty, etc.). This is reflected by the capture factors set to zero and omitted in Table 2 for the transport sector. However, depending on the penetration rate of hydrogen based transport technologies, it might be possible to outfit hydrogen production facilities operating on fossil or biomass feedstocks and fuels with 'CO 2 capture' equipment. The problem is that in most cases models do not explicitly represent and report sources of hydrogen production, although there might be some implicit assumptions. The transport sector provides a huge potential for CO 2 capture but the feasibility depends on the technology. Here we consider only those models to have potential capture from hydrogen production that have an explicit representation of the corresponding energy transformation process. The case is similar with biomass gasification power plants and hydrogen production units in which CO 2 capture might be technically possible. It is perfectly conceivable that these technologies might play a significant role by 2050 in some scenarios (especially in A1T and B1) and produce negative emissions across the full technology chain. Table 2 Proportions of CO 2 resulting from fossil fuel and biomass combustion or conversion available for capture (% of total energy-related CO 2 produced) Table 2 Proportions of CO 2 resulting from fossil fuel and biomass combustion or conversion available for capture (% of total energy-related CO 2 produced) (continued) The capture factors presented in the preceding section are applied to the projected CO 2 production at a high level of detail (sectors, fuels, regions) in four qualitatively different future storylines. The objective is to estimate sector and region specific amounts of CO 2 that might be practically available for capture and storage. It is important to recall that our main attention is devoted to the reasonably expected technical/technological and economic practicality of CO 2 capture and collection from different sources. Accordingly, all those technically feasible capture and collection options are disregarded as impractical, that are estimated to be more expensive by a factor of three or more than the median costs (USD 100/tCO2) of alternative CO 2 mitigation options projected by the same energy economy integrated assessment models that had been used in the SRES scenario quantifications and which provide the background for our assessment. Figure 3 presents the results of applying the capture factors to the six CO 2 emissions projections depicted in Figure 2 . Here again, detailed regional and sectoral capture potentials are assembled for two sets of model results in each of the six scenarios in the Appendix (Table A2) . Even more detailed tables with fuel specific capture assessments are available from the authors.
The total amount of CO 2 we find practical to capture is nonnegligible but modest in 2020 ranging from about 2.6-5 GtCO 2 (approximately 12-17% of the total amount of emissions projected). There are several reasons: both the scenario storylines and the model results diverge only modestly in the near term (the next 15-20 years) and our estimated capture factors also reflect the slow establishment and diffusion of capture technologies. Yet over the medium term by 2050, the capturable amounts become massive: they increase to the level of 17-21 GtCO 2 by 2050 in most scenarios, roughly equal to the total annual emissions at the beginning of this century. The two extremes are the low CO 2 production path in the B1 scenario (with <5 Gt capturable CO 2 ) in which there is not much to capture in the first place and the A1FI scenario with heavy reliance on fossil fuels especially in the power sector and the corresponding large amounts of CO 2 that might be easy to capture (more than 37 GtCO 2 ). Our focus on capture potential does not cover the availability of reliable capacities for storing the vast amounts of CO 2 that we identify as potentially capturable. Yet in this regard, it is an important factor that the bulk of the capture potential stems from the power sector and amounts to about 50 to 65% of the total CO 2 capture estimates.
Looking into the sectoral details, the results indicate that globally around 60% of the CO 2 produced in power generation could be suitable for capture by 2050. Given the differing ways of the underlying characterisations in the models of the power sector and the diverging energy paths incorporated in the scenarios, this is a rather robust outcome. The global range of potential capture expands from 56%, based on the IMAGE model in the B1 scenario to 66% derived from the MESSAGE model in the A1FI scenario. Industry produces considerably lower emissions from smaller and more dispersed sources than the power sector. Accordingly, the capture potentials are significantly smaller as well. They span between 1.5 (scenario B1 according to IMAGE) and 6.5 (scenario A1B from AIM) GtCO 2 and they are more evenly scattered in this range across scenarios and models than the power sector estimates, due to their diverging ways of classifying and modelling industrial energy use, fuels and emissions. Nonetheless, the retained industrial CO 2 amounts to about 30-40% of the total energy related industrial CO 2 production by 2050. Given the astounding differences between CO 2 production trends in Annex B and Non-Annex B regions in all scenarios (see Figure 2) , it is not surprising at all that we find huge capture potentials in the latter group of countries. The right hand series of charts in Figure 3 show that, depending on the scenario, 11-23 GtCO 2 might be available for capture in the Non-Annex B region annually by 2050, except the B1 future, in which anthropogenic climate change would not be a major concern anyway. Even our cautiously optimistic assumptions, about the diffusion of 'CO 2 capture' technologies underlying the capture factors, result in rapidly increasing potential capture volumes beyond 2020. The crucial question is what are the incentives and the mechanisms to utilise these potentials. Irrespective of how the lists of countries with and without quantified emissions reduction commitments might change in the post Kyoto period, it will be important to revisit these issues at the relevant policy fora. Are these capture potentials appropriately covered by the prevailing Kyoto mechanisms so that Annex B countries can rely on using them and Non-Annex B countries might be interested in making them available? This could be an important item on the agendas of future UNFCCC negotiations. There are many other open issues and vibrant research and technology development efforts to solve them. The range of topics covers geology and geochemistry (Bachu and Caroll, 2005) , capture technologies (Aasen et al., 2005) , cost estimates (Wildenborg at al., 2005) and legal issues (Wall et al., 2005) . Two areas are particularly relevant for our discussion. First, it has been emphasised that our primary attention here is on CO 2 capture with the implicit assumption that the captured amount can be transported to and stored at locations sufficiently close to the capture site so that our premise on economic rationality still prevails. Research activities are currently underway at several institutes that explicitly consider the geology (capacity and reliability) as well as the geography (location, transport costs) of possible CO 2 storage sites in selected regions or globally (Dooley et al., 2003 (Dooley et al., , 2005 van Vuuren, 2004) . If storage in some regions turns out to be impossible at the scale of our approximation of captured CO 2 , this would dampen our capture estimates.
The second issue is more significant and it concerns the accuracy of and confidence in our estimates. The transport sector is the fastest growing CO 2 producer in all scenarios. The amount of CO 2 created in transport is projected to approach or surpass that in industry as early as 2020 according to most models in most scenarios. By 2050, the dominance of transport related over industrial CO 2 is even more apparent: in ten out of twelve scenarios, CO 2 from transport is significantly higher; in one scenario it is slightly lower than industrial CO 2 , while one model explicitly includes a huge quantity of hydrogen production (the bulk of it for transport) involving an amount of CO 2 accounting for 36% of the total CO 2 production. Theoretically it is possible, but in reality it would be highly impractical to capture CO 2 on board of vehicles with current hauling technologies. Accordingly, our capture factors in the transport sector, per se, are set to zero. Yet a relatively modest change in currently known transport technologies of the rolling stock (vehicles) and a more significant but also plausible transformation in the fuel supply industry and distribution infrastructure might change this situation relatively fast and at affordable costs. Fuel switch to hydrogen and/or combustion engine replacement by fuel cells or similar technologies is conceivable in all transport technologies. This could change our estimates of capture potentials significantly, due to the centralised and concentrated streams of CO 2 generated at hydrogen production plants. Some models used in the IPCC scenario quantification process (and thus in this paper) explicitly model refineries, hydrogen and synfuel production as separate sectors and we estimated capture factors for them. For the other models it is not possible to trace such technological features even from the detailed output reports and this implies the risk of our underestimating the capture potential. It is certainly an important task for future research.
Discussion and conclusions
The previous section indicates that it might be possible to capture significant amounts of CO 2 during the first half of this century. Assuming that these volumes can be stored safely and with minimum leakage for extended periods of time, will they reduce CO 2 emissions to the level that might be necessary to prevent 'dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system?' This is not the proper place to get into the intricacies of what might be the dangerous rates and magnitudes of climate change, what levels of CO 2 equivalent greenhouse gas concentrations would guarantee not passing those perceived thresholds, and what would be the appropriate distribution of the emission reduction efforts over time, locations and greenhouse gases. For our purposes here, it is sufficient to recall the results of the modelling exercises reported in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001a) .
A large set of models (including those underlying the SRES scenarios) was used to calculate the reduction paths of energy related CO 2 emissions over the 21st century that are required to stabilise atmospheric CO 2 concentrations at 550 ppmv, in the lower segment of the plausible stabilisation range (450-1,000 ppmv) considered by IPCC (2001a) and in the studies on which it draws. The compilation of model results shows that the 550 ppmv stabilisation target requires CO 2 emissions to fall by 30-50% below their corresponding baseline values by 2050 globally and would need to decline by 25-50% relative to their projected baselines in Non-OECD countries over the same time period. Note that these are not absolute reductions compared to actual historical emissions in a single reference year but rather reductions relative to the model and scenario specific baseline emission paths projected in the absence of climate policy interventions. Since the baseline CO 2 emission paths (see Section 2) correspond to this specification and the capture potentials in Section 4 can be interpreted as one specific measure implemented to mitigate emissions, the difference between the two provides the CO 2 amounts still emitted into the atmosphere even if the capture potentials are fully utilised. Table 3 summarises the estimated capture potentials as percentage reductions relative to the model specific baseline emissions for 2020 and 2050. These results indicate that the capture potentials of Annex B countries are reasonably close to the middle of the 30-50% range emerging from the IPCC model survey as the required reduction level by 2050 towards a CO 2 stabilisation goal of 550 ppmv. The Non-Annex B numbers, in contrast, tend to be around the lower end of the IPCC spectrum for Non-OECD countries. Taken as a whole, the estimated potential to avoid about 30-40% of CO 2 emissions globally via capture is considerable, even if one takes into account possible reductions of this potential due to difficulties in collection, transport, storage capacities and leakages. It is also important to recall, however, that these huge amounts result from our rather optimistic estimates of capture factors that appraise the upper limits of capture potentials by considering all capture options that could be implemented at the cost of up to three times of the time dependent median CO 2 mitigation costs in the IPCC (2001a) survey. Obviously, other energy technologies and CO 2 mitigation options will compete in regions and sectors where CO 2 capture and storage turns out to be in the upper segment of our estimated range. Nevertheless, CO 2 capture and storage alone cannot resolve the problem of anthropogenic climate change. CO 2 reduction rates cited from IPCC as a reference point for Table 3 refer to CO 2 concentrations alone. Considering the projected emissions, atmospheric lifetimes and radiative forcing, reduction options and costs of other greenhouse gases, they amount to approximately 100 ppmv CO 2 equivalent concentrations in long term climate stabilisation accounts (IPCC, 2001b) . This means that a 550 CO 2 equivalent stabilisation target would require either the mitigation of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases in proportion to that of CO 2 or the more than proportional reduction of CO 2 . Moreover, the cited stabilisation runs typically involve medium climate sensitivity factors: 2.5°C for doubling CO 2 equivalent GHG concentrations. If climate sensitivity turns out to be in the upper half of the currently estimated range, more mitigation will be required to achieve climate stabilisation at the same temperature target level. We conducted a simple uncertainty analysis that compares baseline CO 2 generation, capture potentials and the remaining emissions across pairs of models for each of the six IPCC scenarios. While there are obvious differences in the model formulations and in the results they produce, our results seem to be reasonably robust concerning the main policy insights. Figure 4 presents CO 2 quantities that are likely to be emitted after accounting for the total amount that might be possible to capture and store according to our estimates in the previous sections. With the exception of the B1 scenario, most runs of the principal models (those underlying the marker and illustrative scenarios in IPCC SRES) and of the additional models (included as part of the uncertainty analysis) result in roughly doubled net emissions by 2050. Future work will need to explore the climate change implications of these remaining emissions and the benefits associated with the reduced emissions paths in terms of averted climate change damages as well as the costs of implementing the capture and storage schemes both in absolute terms and relative to those of other mitigation options.
Our final conclusion is that CO 2 capture and storage is an important option in the climate policy portfolio. It implies a potentially significant contribution to mitigate climate change, but it is unlikely to be sufficient if it turns out to be necessary to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at about 650 ppmv CO 2 equivalents or below. A larger portfolio of mitigation measures will be required that includes technological advances to increase the efficiency of energy use, non CO 2 emitting energy technologies like nuclear power (Nifenecker et al., 2003; IEA, 2003b) , the utilisation of renewable energy sources and innovative energy systems like fusion or solar power satellites (Hoffert et al., 2002; Belyaev et al., 2002) . With a view to the immense uncertainties still characterising the anthropogenic climate change problem and its mitigation options, it is an important task for climate policy to keep all sensible options open and provide a level playing field to foster environmentally effective, socially equitable, economically efficient and politically feasible mitigation strategies. 
